Law

Without much ado, on a bare perusal of the facts of this case, it is quite evident that Stan has inadvertently caused Mikes death but whether or not he will be held liable on a charge of manslaughter as a result of it, is a matter of law and not of fact. Taking into consideration the facts of this case as well as the law in this regard the following article shall attempt at delineating the extent of Stans liability as far as Mikes death is concerned.

As has been stated in the very first line, Stan is responsible for the death of Mike, even though he certainly did not foresee the chain of events that was to follow after he set Ollies house on fire. Thus in criminal law parlance, it shall not be incorrect to state that Stans mens rea or motive was only to the extent of destroying the hedge in dispute and not to the commission of a homicide. In fact, Stan had set the hedge ablaze believing that Ollie and his entire family was away, so it can be safely said that he did not intend to do anything beyond that. Admittedly his actions would constitute the crime of arson (in the third degree) but on a direct assessment of the motive and malice behind Stans actions, it would appear that a charge of simple voluntary manslaughter would not be tenable against him.

However, to understand how liabilities are affixed as regards different distinct criminal charges against the same person, the two theories of causation and foreseeability must first be understood. Both these concepts originated in English common law and have gained considerable importance in the law of torts and crimes. Under the causation rule, a person is liable for all acts that were caused by his actions, unless there has occurred any new action (referred top as novus actus interveniens) that has intervened and affected this chain of causation. This rule disregards the notion of foreseeability, i.e. it is immaterial whether the person committing the act could reasonably foresee the subsequent effects of his actions, as long as he was responsible for the initial effect. Contrarily, the rule of foreseeability holds that liability extends only to the point of reasonable foreseeable consequence and not any further. Both these tests have vociferous support from their respective schools of thought. And criminal cases often turn on the issue of foreseeability when proximate cause is in question.

In general courts have held that a person could be held liable only if it could be shown that a probable or foreseeable consequence of his act would cause serious injury or death. Now, as per the foreseeability test the court has to analyse the act from the point of view of a reasonable man. In this case, whether Stan ought to have reasonably foreseen that Mike would have been present in the house and that there would be a wind that would spread the fire to the house and that Mike would succumb to his burns at the hospital owing to an erroneous medication  all these questions are matters of fact and is for the jury to decide. But even though one may state that it could be reasonably foreseen that the fire would spread to the house, and that Stan ought to have known that there was a likelihood of someone being present on the premises (based on the lights and the music playing etc. etc.) it is a bit of a stretch, (both legally as well as in a purely common-sensical manner) to expect that Stan should also have known that the person inside the house at the time of the fire was Mike, and moreover, that Mike suffered from an allergy and would not respond to the prescribed medication.

In an English case that dealt with the concept of novus actus interveniens, R v Smith, where a man had stabbed another man, who eventually died as a result of improper medical attention to his stab wounds, the accused was convicted of manslaughter rather than murder. However, it is pertinent to note two things here firstly, the victim was in fit condition and suffered from no known allergies or chronic defects and secondly that the defence was able to prove that if the victim had received proper medical treatment subsequently, he would have survived. In contrast with that case, here Mike suffered from a medical deformity (even though Stan was unaware of it) and while perhaps a more experienced doctor would have been able to prescribe the proper medication, taking Mikes allergy into account, there is little on record to show that the junior doctor had not exercised due care and caution in dealing with Mikes burns. In any case, to determine whether the fire injuries suffered by Mike was enough to cause his death or whether the ingestion of the prescribed medicine was, legally speaking, a novus actus interveniens, the medical evidence on record (autopsy report and the junior doctors diagnosis) must be scrutinized carefully.

There is however one more bone of contention. If Stan had deliberately set Ollies house on fire, knowing that Mike would be inside, then he may have ended up being convicted, either for voluntary manslaughter or for murder. But in the present scenario, Stan had no intention of killing Mike (or anyone else) or even burning down the house, for that matter. Should Stan be charged with the either or both of the aforementioned offences, the prosecution would have a hard time convincing the jury of Stans mens rea as regards those offences.

This does not absolve Stan from facing any kind of homicide-related charges though. Aside from voluntary manslaughter and murder, there is also the question of involuntary manslaughter, i.e. manslaughter caused without any intention to kill. Also over the years, American criminal jurisprudence has also come to recognize a different class of homicides known as felony homicides. Under this concept, a person can be held liable for a charge of murder if the death of a victim had occurred while the former was committing a felony or during an attempt to commit a felony, even though the latter may have had no intention of killing the latter. As an example, if a person sets fire to a warehouse, he is naturally guilty of the crime of arson, but if the resultant fire caused someone inside the warehouse to be burnt to death, then the accused can also be held guilty of murder under this rule. As regards the necessary mens rea for the offence of murder, it is imputed to the mens rea for the initial offence (i.e. arson in this case), and thus a homicide committed in the course of a felony, qualifies as a murder in the first degree. This rule has come under a fair degree of criticism for its harshness, and indeed most American courts are loath to slap murder convictions in cases of this nature. Nevertheless, the fact remains that felony murder is a statutorily recognized offence in most States in the US and is seen as serving as a deterrent to the commission of such felonies.

However even a charge of felony murder against Stan in the present case (the felony being of course, arson) seems rather flimsy in light of the stated facts. Under criminal law, the offence of arson involves the deliberate burning of a building and in this case Stan had no intention of burning Ollies house. However, in light of the fact that there was a breeze blowing at the time Stan set fire to the disputed hedge, it seems that a jury would be inclined to hold that the burning down of the house ought to have been reasonably foreseen by Stan.

Notwithstanding the foreseeability test, it is also pertinent to note here that certain American States have classified arson into various degrees depending on the severity of the offence (all of which are also felonies) and consequently Stan can still be charged with the commission of arson (albeit of a lesser degree) which, in turn, would make him susceptible to a charge of felony murder. For instance if this entire incident occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of California, then Stan would have been charged with, inter alia, committing an offence under Sections 451 and 452 of the CA Penal Code, which deal with the offences of arson and unlawful setting of fire to structure forest land or property  the former is a felony while the latter is a misdemeanor. The only distinction between the two is that in the latter it is an act of wanton recklessness while the former is an intentional act. Now, even if Stan did not intend to burn down Ollies house, he did intend to burn down the hedge and so his act would still fall under the category of arson.

Thus on analysis of the entire case, it seems that Stan could be held liable for arson (in a lesser degree) and depending on the manner in which the jury interprets his actions, felony murder or involuntary manslaughter. Of course, if the jury decides in favor of substituting the charge of arson to a lesser one of unlawful burning of property (which is a misdemeanor), then Stan can only be found criminally liable of involuntary manslaughter and not felony murder. Also, crucially, the prosecution must also establish that the fire, on its own, was sufficient to cause so much injury to Mike as to result in his death sooner or later, and that consequently, the negligence on the part of the junior doctor did not any way alter the foreseeable sequence of events. If however, the prosecution is unable to show that this was the case, Stan can only be convicted of an attempt to commit involuntary manslaughter or felony murder.