Law

Question 1. According to the UN Charter, all UN members bear an international obligation to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations (Charter of the United Nations, 1945, Art. 2(4) at httpwww.un.orgendocumentscharterchapter1.shtml). Subject to article 33 of the UN Charter, The parties to any disputewhich is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution bypeaceful means (Charter of the United Nations, Art. 33(1)). Thus, Catonia is in breach of its obligations under the UN Charter. The right of self-defense claimed by General Calfas is stipulated in article 51 of the UN Charter which reads that nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations (Charter of the United Nations, Art. 51). The rule is inapplicable in the case, since Torana never actually attacked Catonia, thus an armed attack as precondition for exercising the right of self-defense is not present in the case.
Question 2. Subject to article 2 of the UN Convention Against Torture No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat or war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture (Convention Against Torture, 1984, Art. 2(1) at  HYPERLINK httpwww.hrweb.orglegalcat.html httpwww.hrweb.orglegalcat.html). Thus, references to the state of war or saving lives cannot be considered as justification of torture under international law and Torana is in breach of its obligations under UN Convention Against Torture.
Question 3. By torturing Captain Fourd Torana is in breach of its international obligations not only under the Convention Against Torture, but under other international instruments as well. As a UN-member it violated the rule provided in article 5 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, namely No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Art. 5 at  HYPERLINK httpwww.un.orgendocumentsudhr httpwww.un.orgendocumentsudhr). The rule has been repeated in UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, Art. 7 at  HYPERLINK httpfletcher.tufts.edumultitextsBH498.txt httpfletcher.tufts.edumultitextsBH498.txt). The universal character of torture prohibition has been reaffirmed by the UN in its Declaration of 1975 which provided that no state shall may permit or tolerate tortureexceptional circumstancesmay not be invoked as justification of torture (United Nations Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, 1975, Art. 3 at  HYPERLINK httpdaccess-ods.un.orgTMP8482562.89958954.html httpdaccess-ods.un.orgTMP8482562.89958954.html) and Protocol of 2002 (Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 2002 at  HYPERLINK httpwww2.ohchr.orgenglishlawcat-one.htm httpwww2.ohchr.orgenglishlawcat-one.htm).
Question 4.  Torana violated its international obligations in its actions regarding Aldonian embassy. Under Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the premises of the mission shall be inviolableThe receiving state is under special obligation to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion (Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, Art. 22(1), 22(2) at  HYPERLINK httpuntreaty.un.orgilctextsinstrumentsenglishconventions9_1_1961.pdf httpuntreaty.un.orgilctextsinstrumentsenglishconventions9_1_1961.pdf). Thus, Torana  is in breach of obligation to ensure the inviolability of Aldonian diplomatic mission by the mere fact of installation of electronic listening equipment. As regards rejection of the right of diplomatic asylum by Torana and the related actions, there is not firm international obligation that would prohibit such actions of Torana. There are certain regional rules (like Convention on Diplomatic Asylum Convention on Diplomatic Asylum of 1954), however, there is no universal rule. In the Asylum case the ICJ has found out that asylum could only intervene against action of justice in cases where arbitrary action was substituted for the rule of law (Asylum Case, ICJ, 1950, p. 17 at  HYPERLINK httpwww.icj-cij.orgdocketfiles71851.pdf httpwww.icj-cij.orgdocketfiles71851.pdf). No information is provided concerning breach of immunity of the diplomatic mission or prevention of its normal work, except for prevention of Fourds extradition, thus  no violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations occurred in the case.
Question 5. The Chief of National Police is not correct. The explicit rule of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations reads that the agents of the receiving state may not enter premises of a diplomatic mission, except with the consent of the head of the mission (Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, Art. 22(1)). Since no corresponding permission has been granted to Toranan police, they may not enter Aldonian embassy.
Question 6. The attack of the National Palace falls within jurisdiction of the ICC as a war crime. This category of crimes includes intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1999, Art. 8(b) at  HYPERLINK httpuntreaty.un.orgcodiccstatuteromefra.htm httpuntreaty.un.orgcodiccstatuteromefra.htm). It is known from the facts of the cenario that a commando squad under Captain Fourds command launched grenade and mortar rounds at National Palace. The National Palace is not a military object since no missile installations are placed in it or near it (this is indicated on the map), and there is no other evidence that would prove the use of National Palace for military purposes. More than that, the Palace is currently housing a museum of Toranan historical and cultural treasures. Thus, this action falls under definition of war crime under the ICC statute and is subject to ICC jurisdiction.
Question 7. Milindis claim of innocent passage is legally invalid. Subject to the UNCLOS, the right of innocent passage can be exercised within the limits of states territorial waters (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, Art. 17 at  HYPERLINK httpwww.un.orgDeptslosconvention_agreementstextsunclosclosindx.htm httpwww.un.orgDeptslosconvention_agreementstextsunclosclosindx.htm). According to article 3 of the UNCLOS, the limits of territorial sea cannot exceed 12 miles measured from coastal baselines. It is known from the facts of the scenario that Milindis warship are operating at a distance of approximately 15 miles from Toranan coasts. Thus, there can be no issue of innocent passage, since Milindis warships never entered Toranan territorial waters.
Question 8. Waters outside of states territorial waters fall under definition of the high seas (Convention on the High Seas, 1958, Art. 1 at  HYPERLINK httpuntreaty.un.orgilctextsinstrumentsenglishconventions8_1_1958_high_seas.pdf httpuntreaty.un.orgilctextsinstrumentsenglishconventions8_1_1958_high_seas.pdf). Subject to article 87 of the UNCLOS ships of all states enjoy freedom of navigation in the high seas (UNCLOS, 1982, Art. 87(1)). However, this right shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas (UNCLOS, 1982, Art. 87(2)). This is a firmly established rule of international law first declared in the case of schooners Jessie, Thomas F. Bayard and Pescawha in 1921. The rule of the mentioned case reads as follows it is a fundamental principle of international maritime law thatinterference by a cruiser with a foreign vessel pursuing a lawful avocation in the high seas is unwarranted and illegal (Owners of the Jessie, the Thomas F. Bayard and the Pescawha (Great Britain) v. United States, 1921. RIAA, vol. 6, 1921, Dec. 2, p. 58 at httpuntreaty.un.orgcodriaacasesvol_VI57-60_Jessie.pdf). More than that, under article 88 of the UNCLOS, the high seas is reserved for peaceful purposes. Criss-crossing by Milindis warships prevented cargo vessels of other nations from entering into Taranan territorial waters in the course of their normal voyages. Thus, Milindi is in breach of its obligation not to infringe the interests of other states in the high seas.
Question 9. Specific measures that can be used by the UN Security Council are stipulated in articles 34, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of the UN Charter. The precondition of interference by the Security Council is any disputeis likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security (UN Charter, Art. 34). According to article 39 of the UN Charter, the Security Council is entitled to make recommendations to settle the dispute in a peaceful manner. Article 40 of the UN Charter entitles the Security Council to call upon the parties to comply with provisional measures prescribed by it. Subject to article 41 of the UN Charter the Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions. In case the measures taken prove to be inadequate and the disputable situation constitutes a grave threat to international peace and security, the Security Council may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security (UN Charter, Art. 42). In the case the SC has a right to authorize specific measures against Milindi since it proved to be reluctant to settle the dispute via negotiations with Torana. Specific measures can be authorized against Torana in case its further actions would aggravate the situation.
Question 10. Under the international law the United States are directly prohibited to extradite Steven B. The Convention Against Torture stipulates that no State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture (Convention Against Torture, Art. 3(1). Steven B. has already been subjected to arbitrary arrest and torture in Catonia, thus there are substantial grounds to believe that, in case extradited, he can be subjected to torture once again. Thus, as a party to CAT the USA is obliged to deny extradition of Steven B. to Catonia. In the case the universal conventional norm prevails over the norm of a bilateral treaty.

Question 11. Under the general rule provided in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 1976, 1604 At  HYPERLINK httpwww.law.cornell.eduuscode28ch97.html httpwww.law.cornell.eduuscode28ch97.html). However,  1605 of the same Act stipulates certain exceptions from the immunity rule, which can be used by Smith to justify his claim. Under  1606 of the Act, As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is not entitled to immunity under section 1605 or 1607 of this chapter, the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. Thus, in case Smith is able to prove that the case falls under the exception, the case, the proceedings can be instituted in a district court.
Question 12. The US District Court is not likely to accept jurisdiction over Smiths claim against Torana. The reason is that in fact Smith lacks grounds to prove that exception rule works in the case. The related exceptions provided in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act are cases in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 1976, 1605(3)) and in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 1976, 1605(5)). However, neither of the exceptions can be found in the case. The first exception does not work because Smiths property was only damaged, but not seized. The second exception does not work because the action in question occurred outside of the United States territory.